Every problem in the chapter beside the book’s answer, a chapter at a time as you scroll.

Chapter 10: Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly

4 problems · 3 figures

10-1 §10.1 source ↗

Suppose that, due to a successful advertising campaign, a monopolistic competitor experiences an increase in demand for its product. How will that affect the price it charges and the quantity it supplies?

Answer

An increase in demand will manifest itself as a rightward shift in the demand curve, and a rightward shift in marginal revenue. The shift in marginal revenue will cause a movement up the marginal cost curve to the new intersection between MR and MC at a higher level of output. The new price can be read by drawing a line up from the new output level to the new demand curve, and then over to the vertical axis. The new price should be higher. The increase in quantity will cause a movement along the average cost curve to a possibly higher level of average cost. The price, though, will increase more, causing an increase in total profits.

10-2 §10.1 source ↗

Continuing with the scenario in question 1, in the long run, the positive economic profits that the monopolistic competitor earns will attract a response either from existing firms in the industry or firms outside. As those firms capture the original firm’s profit, what will happen to the original firm’s profit-maximizing price and output levels?

Answer

As long as the original firm is earning positive economic profits, other firms will respond in ways that take away the original firm’s profits. This will manifest itself as a decrease in demand for the original firm’s product, a decrease in the firm’s profit-maximizing price and a decrease in the firm’s profit-maximizing level of output, essentially unwinding the process described in the answer to question 1. In the long-run equilibrium, all firms in monopolistically competitive markets will earn zero economic profits.

10-3 §10.2 source ↗

Consider the curve in the figure below, which shows the market demand, marginal cost, and marginal revenue curve for firms in an oligopolistic industry. In this example, we assume firms have zero fixed costs.

a. Suppose the firms collude to form a cartel. What price will the cartel charge? What quantity will the cartel supply? How much profit will the cartel earn?

b. Suppose now that the cartel breaks up and the oligopolistic firms compete as vigorously as possible by cutting the price and increasing sales. What will be the industry quantity and price? What will be the collective profits of all firms in the industry?

c. Compare the equilibrium price, quantity, and profit for the cartel and cutthroat competition outcomes.

Figure 10.6 in the book ↗

Answer

a. If the firms form a cartel, they will act like a monopoly, choosing the quantity of output where MR = MC. Drawing a line from the monopoly quantity up to the demand curve shows the monopoly price. Assuming that fixed costs are zero, and with an understanding of cost and profit, we can infer that when the marginal cost curve is horizontal, average cost is the same as marginal cost. Thus, the cartel will earn positive economic profits equal to the area of the rectangle, with a base equal to the monopoly quantity and a height equal to the difference between price (on the demand above the monopoly quantity) and average cost, as shown in the following figure. The graph shows three solid lines: a downward sloping demand curve, a downward sloping marginal revenue curve, and a horizontal, straight marginal cost line. The graph also shows two dashed lines that meet at the demand curve and identify the profit-maximizing price and quantity.

b. The firms will expand output and cut price as long as there are profits remaining. The long-run equilibrium will occur at the point where average cost equals demand. As a result, the oligopoly will earn zero economic profits due to “cutthroat competition,” as shown in the next figure. The graph shows three solid lines: a downward sloping demand curve, a downward sloping marginal revenue curve, and a horizontal, straight marginal cost line. The graph also shows one dashed line that extends from the x-axis and ends at the demand curve/marginal cost intersection.

c. Pc > Pcc. Qc < Qcc. Profit for the cartel is positive and large. Profit for cutthroat competition is zero.

10-4 §10.2 source ↗

Sometimes oligopolies in the same industry are very different in size. Suppose we have a duopoly where one firm (Firm A) is large and the other firm (Firm B) is small, as the prisoner’s dilemma box in Table 10.4 shows.

Assuming that both firms know the payoffs, what is the likely outcome in this case?

Table 10.4 in the book ↗
Firm B colludes with Firm A Firm B cheats by selling more output
Firm A colludes with Firm B A gets $1,000, B gets $100 A gets $800, B gets $200
Firm A cheats by selling more output A gets $1,050, B gets $50 A gets $500, B gets $20

Answer

Firm B reasons that if it cheats and Firm A does not notice, it will double its money. Since Firm A’s profits will decline substantially, however, it is likely that Firm A will notice and if so, Firm A will cheat also, with the result that Firm B will lose 90% of what it gained by cheating. Firm A will reason that Firm B is unlikely to risk cheating. If neither firm cheats, Firm A earns $1000. If Firm A cheats, assuming Firm B does not cheat, A can boost its profits only a little, since Firm B is so small. If both firms cheat, then Firm A loses at least 50% of what it could have earned. The possibility of a small gain ($50) is probably not enough to induce Firm A to cheat, so in this case it is likely that both firms will collude.

Loading chapter 11…

Problems and answers are adapted from Principles of Economics 3e by Steven A. Greenlaw, David Shapiro and Daniel MacDonald, OpenStax, and are used under the CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 licence. Access for free at https://openstax.org/books/principles-economics-3e/pages/1-introduction. Illustrations: Copyright Rice University, OpenStax, under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 license. This adaptation is released under the same licence, is non-commercial, and is neither affiliated with nor endorsed by OpenStax or Rice University.